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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,:
vs.

:

GEORGE K. COMISH,

Case Nos. 14824
14825

:

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, George K. Cornish, appeals from
judgments of conviction and sentences thereon in two separate
cases entered against him in the Third Judicial District Court
for the crime of unlawful distribution for value of a controlled substance.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant George K. Cornish was convicted by the
court in two cases of the crime of unlawful distribution for
value of a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant George K. Cornish seeks the reversal
of the court below and an order that the court below enter
a judgment of not guilty as to each case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These cases were tried upon stipulated facts to
the court sitting without a jury.

In Case No. 14824 the

stipulated facts show that Appellant George K. Cornish on
September 16, 1975, sold a controlled substance, to wit:
marijuana, to Terry Wright, a police officer employed by the
University of Utah who was acting under the supervision of
one Larry Hedberg, a deputized member of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office. (R. 47,48)

This purchase of marijuana took

place at the defendant's residence which was not on the University

of Utah property. (R.48)

(

It was further stipulated

that Terry Wright was not a special deputy. (R.49)

Exhibit 2

was received (R.50) and that exhibit showed that Terry Wright

^

was driving around Salt Lake City, picked up some hitch hikers,
asked them where he could buy some marijuana, was taken to the
home of appellant where he testified he purchased marijuana

<

from Appellant George K. Cornish.
In Case No. 14825 the stipulated facts were to

i
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the same effect as the previous case except the date of the
transaction was October 25, 1975. (R.47)

The purchase was

made at the same place, by the same officer, who, according
to his report (Exhibit 2) went there on his own on this
occasion.
After the submission of the case to the court
on stipulated facts the court received memorandums from both
parties and took the matter under advisement, later denying
appellant's motion to dismiss made on the basis that the
evidence of the State consisted solely of uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice, Terry Wright, because Officer
Wright was acting without his jurisdiction because the transaction was not related to the University of Utah, its property,
or its interests.
The court took appellant's motions under advisement
and later on August 24, 1976, denied the motion and found
appellant guilty in each case. (R.33)
ARGUMENT
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE
INFORMATIONS BECAUSE THE STATE'S
CASES WERE BASED ENTIRELY UPON
TESTIMONY OF AN UNCORROBORATED
ACCOMPLICE.
Appellant contends that his convictions must be
set aside because they are based upon the uncorroborated

3
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testimony of an accomplice.
The person to whom appellant allegedly sold the
controlled substance was a member of the University of Utah
Police Department.

Under Utah Code Annotated, Section 53-45-5

(1953) members of such a police department have "such powers
as peace officers in cities and by sheriffs but they may be
exercised only in cities where the institution is located and
"only in connection with actions occurring on the property
of such institution or when required for the protection of
its interests, property, students or employees; and otherwise
within such counties when specifically requested by the State
or local law enforcement officials having jurisdiction."

This

court in State of Utah in the interest of Hurley, 28 U.2d
248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972) dealt with the above statute.

This

court explained that the legislative intent was to restrict
the extraterritorial exercise of the power of institutional
police with one exception, that being when required for the
protection of student interests.

This court said, 28 U.2d

at 251, "thus, the legislature, in this exception, has granted
power to these institutional police, beyond the property of
the institution, only under some type of exigent circum-

^

stances, where the direct and immediate interests of the institution concerning its property, students, or employees is
{

involved.

4
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Appellant contends that the general interests of
curbing drug abuse and apprehending offenders of Utah's
Controlled Substances Act is not the kind of interest this
court and the statute contemplate when they say that exigent
circumstances must exist before University Police are given
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Based upon the above analysis appellant contends
it is clear that Mr. Terry Wright was not engaged in any
official duty and thus made the alleged purchase purely and
simply as a private citizen and he stands on no different
footing than any private citizen.
Mr. Wright thus is clearly an accomplice under
our criminal code.

Utah Code Annotated, 76-2-202(1953), as

amended, states as follows:
Every person, acting with the
mental state required for the
commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense,
who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally
aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally
liable as a party for such conduct.
Under the facts as stated there can be no question but that
Mr. Wright solicited, requested, encouraged and intentionally
aided Mr. Cornish, appellant herein, to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense.

The stipulated facts show that Mr.

5
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Wright went to the home of appellant and asked him to sell
a controlled substance and there can be no real question but
that such conduct on behalf of Mr. Wright amounted to a
solicitation or request or encouragement or aid of an offense.
The question then becomes, did Mr. Wright "act with the mental
state required for the commission of an offense"?

Appellant

contends he clearly did.
For Mr. Cornish to commit the offense under Utah
Code Annotated, 58-37-8 (1) (a) (1953) it is required that the
State prove that-the person acts "knowingly and intentionally".
The terms "knowingly" and "intentionally" are defined in
Utah Code Annotated, 76-2-103 (1953).

In essence those

statutory definitions say that if a person has a conscious
objective to engage in certain conduct he acts "intelligently"
and if he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause a result he acts "knowingly".

It cannot be validly

claimed by the State that Mr. Wright did not knowingly or
intentionally act in soliciting and encouraging an offense.
Of course, the definition of who is responsible for a crime
in Utah Code Annotated, 76-2-202 and the above definitions
are applicable to the Controlled Substances Act under which

^

appellant WcxS charged because of the provisions in 76-1-103
(1953), which provide that the criminal code governs the
(
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construction of, the punishment for, and the defense against
any offense defined in the criminal code or, except where
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise
requires, any offense defined outside the criminal code.
For the State to convict appellant of the offense
as charged it has only to prove that appellant acted intentionally and knowingly and distributed a controlled substance.
That same intent is all tha t is required of a person who solicits
or requests or encourages the commission of those acts.
Therefore, it is clear that Mr. Wright did have the intent
required for the commission of the offense.
Thus it can be seen that Mr. Terry Wright acted
with the mental state required to commit the offense, knowingly
or

intentionally, and he solicited, encouraged, requested,

and aided in the commission of an offense.

Mr. Wright is

thus as criminally responsible as Mr. Cornish under Utah Code
Annotated, 76-2-202, (1953).

To be equally criminally respon-

sible means that Mr. Wright is an accomplice in that he could
be charged with the same offense as appellant.

See, for

example, State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94 (1929).
Under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated,
Section 77-31-18, it is clear that a person may not be
convicted solely on the testimony of an accomplice without

7
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some corroboration.
The testmiony of an accomplice must be corroborated
by other independent testimony
ating evidence

or evidence.

This corrobor-

must, standing alone, tend to implicate and

connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, and
this corroborating evidence or testimony must be inconsistent
with the defendant's innocence and consistent only with guilt
and must do more than cast a grave suspicion on the defendant.
See, for example, State v. Erwin, 105 Utah 3 65, 120 P.2d
V

285 (1961); State v. Sinclair, 150 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d
465 (1964).

Thus, for the State to contend that there is

any corroborating evidence is a misleading argument.

For

the State to argue that because a controlled substance was
introduced into evidence that this exhibit corroborates
Mr. Wright is not convincing.

Appellant contends that the

character of a substance provides no corroboration as to the
source of the substance.

Appellant contends that Mr. Wright's

testimony as to where he obtained the substance is what must
be corroborated and for the State to argue that Mr. Wright's
testimony that he obtained marijuana from appellant is
corroborated by the presence of marijuana sorely misses
appellant's contention that the source of the obtaining is
what is crucial.

i
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Clearly there is no corroboration in this matter
as to the source of the controlled substance.
Appellant realizes that this court has dealt in
the past with the contention that a person who purchases a controlled substance is an accomplice.

See, for example, State v.

Kasai, 27 U.2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972).

Of course, that case

was decided before the effective date of our criminal code and
so appellant's main point, the provisions of Utah Code Annotated,
76-2-202 (1953), was not considered.

Appellant contends that

our recent criminal code has altered the ruling required by
the rationale of Kasai and similar cases.
appellant is not

More importantly,

contending that all law enforcement officers

who make purchases of controlled substances are accomplices
of the seller.

Only when the purchaser is a law enforcement

officer acting outside of his jurisdiction, and thus as a
private citizen, is he an accomplice, and that is what appellant's
argument contends.
Utah Code Annotated, 77-13-36 (1953) does not
expand the jurisdiction of the University of Utah Police
Officers under the circumstances of this case.

That statute

provides that any police officer duly authorized by any
governmental entity of the state may exercise a peace
officer's authority beyond the limits of his normal jurisdiction when, among other things not relevant here, a public
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offense is committed in such officer's presence.
Initially appellant contends that the statute
applies to an officer authorized by any "governmental entity"
of the state.

Defendant contends that the University of Utah

is not a governmental entity of the State of Utah and so the
statute in its entirety is inapplicable.

Second, and more

importantly, subparagraph (2) of 77-13-36 requires that before
the statute is operative a peace officer acting out of his
jurisdiction shall notify and receive approval of the local
law enforcement authority before acting and if that is not
possible, notification must be given as soon as is reasonably
possible thereafter.

Under the facts of this case there was

no evidence before the court that Mr. Wright did not have time
to inform appropriate local Salt Lake City or Salt Lake County
authorities of his proposed action and there was no evidence
before the court that after his activities he notified the
appropriate local law enforcement authorities.

For these

reasons appellant contends the statute is unavailable to the
State to help broaden the territorial jurisdiction of the
University of Utah Police officers under these circumstances.
While the stipulated facts before the court indicate that officer Hedberg was a sworn deputy of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office, defendant contends that the statute
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allows extraterritorial police power when a request is made
by a member of a local law enforcement agency, not by a
member of an institutional police department who has been
sworn to act as a local law enforcement officer.
Further, a careful reading of the statute shows
the clear legislative intent to not simply allow peace
officers of any jurisdiction to roam about the state of
Utah and solicit and request and encourage the commission of
crime but rather to assist them in what amounts to exigent
circumstances.

That is, when in hot pursuit or when called

upon specifically to assist other officers or to continue
an ongoing investigation a peace officer of one territorial
jurisdiction may exercise authority beyond the limits of
his normal jurisdiction.

When a peace officer is out of his

jurisdiction and happens to view an offense occurring in
his presence he can also act.

However, there is a vast differ-

ence between a police officer simply viewing an offense being
committed by happenstance and actively and ongoingly engaging
in a solicitation and a request that an offense be committed.
Thus, if Mr. Wright were simply in downtown Salt Lake City
and observed an offense being committed in his presence he
could act under the above statute.

However, for him to

encourage and solicit an offense is a different matter and
one that we are faced with here and one which should be con-
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demned.

The above statute speaks in terms of gaining approval

when planned activity is contemplated and should in no way
be interpreted as a license for peace officers to roam the
state of Utah or any other jurisdiction and attempt to make
crimes occur.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that appellant was
convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,
appellant respectfully submits that the judgments of the court
below should be reversed and the lower court should be ordered
to enter a judgment of not guilty.
Respectfully submitted,

Bruce C. Lubeck
Attorney for Appellant
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